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The questions that arise when one attempts to define the relationship 
between neo-kantianism and neo-hegelianism may be formulated as 
follows: are we speaking of two parallel “neo-philosophies”, or is the 
common prefix insufficient for us to speak of a simple analogy between 
them. In the latter case, it would be necessary to examine the entire set 
of differences between the two neo-philosophies in order to find their 
reference to a philosopher analysed and the significance of their achieve-
ments to the research on the reception of the philosopher they refer to. 
The thus formulated question is all the more reasonable as such a scena- 
rio is realised in the case of a question of a relationship occurring be-
tween neo-kantianism and neo-hegelianism.
While analysing the problem of reception of Kant’s philosophy in 
relation to the reception of Hegel’s philosophy, Herbert Schnädelbach 
notes: “Firstly, a Hegelian party in the obvious understanding does not 
exist; secondly, not all of those who refer to Kant automatically become 
neo-Kantians. The second issue is as follows: the difference between an 
»-ian« and a »neo-ian« is that the starting point for a »neo-ian« rests in 
the impossibility of a direct continuation of the thought of the author he 
refers to; for him he becomes historical. Hence a »neo-ian« does not see 
any other option than to practise his thought in his “spirit”. What distin-
guishes neo-kantianism from the Kantian movement of the second half 
of the nineteenth century, and also neo-hegelianism from Hegelianism 
proper, is – to introduce a certain order – the historical awareness, the 
experience of breaking the tradition in such a manner that the »a return 
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to...!« stands a chance only as »a going beyond...!«.1 The period of re-
naissance of the classics – from Trendelenburg’s neo-aristotelism to the 
neo-marxism of the 1920s – is the time of historicism which, contrary to 
traditionalism wished to be modern, i.e. future-oriented due to histori-
cal education, which is mainly confirmed by its historical architecture. 
There is nothing more erroneous than the belief that neo-Kantians in fact 
wanted to be traditional Kantians; what they wanted was not only to be 
Kantians but also the »new« – independent (originäre) philosophers”.2 
However, this thesis is in conflict with what one of the representatives of 
neo-hegelianism, Richard Kroner, wrote in the Introduction to his opus vi-
tae. “As Windelband once said: »to understand Kant means to go beyond 
him«; thus, we may say that understanding Hegel means absolutely not 
being able to go any further. However, if there should be something 
»post-Hegel«, then it is required to create a new beginning”.3
We must first of all refer to the texts invoked by Schnädelbach, name-
ly those by Windelband and Rickert. In the first place, he refers to a col-
lection of texts by Windelband published in 1884, who in the preface 
dated for “October 1883” notes that: “All of us who practise philosophy 
in the nineteenth century are Kant’s disciples. However, our today’s 
»return« to him should not only constitute the renewal of a historically 
founded form in which he presents the idea of critical philosophy. The 
stronger the antagonism revealed between the various motives of his 
thinking is depicted, the more measures can we discover to discuss the 
problems which he created with his solutions to the problems. To under-
stand Kant means to go beyond him [bolded by – AJN]”.4 In the second 
case, Schnädelbach refers to the memoirs on Alois Riehl (27.05.1844 – 
21.11.1924) by Heinrich Rickert, in which the founder of the great Baden 
 1 In 1882 Wilhelm Windelband said: „To understand Kant means to go beyond 
him”, and in 1924 Heirich Rickert, looking back at the history of neokantism, found 
that his representatives „by returning to Kant significantly pushed scientific philoso-
phy forward”. As cited in: H. Holzhey: Neukantianismus. In: Historisches Wörterbuch 
der Philosophie. Bd. 6. Basel–Stuttgart 1984, col. 747 et seq. [note – H.S.]. It is necessary 
to add to Schnädelbach‘s note that the actual quote is as follows: „However, they are 
rightly called neo-Kantians as they have returned to Kant while, at the same time, 
significantly pushing scientific philosophy forward“. H. Rickert: Alois Riehl. “Logos” 
1924–25, Bd. 13, p. 164.
 2  H. Schnädelbach: Nasz nowy neokantyzm. Trans. A.J. Noras. “Folia Philosophi-
ca”. Ed. P. Łaciak. T. 24. Katowice 2006, pp. 15–16.
 3 „Wenn Windelband einmal sagt: »Kant verstehen heißt über ihn hinausgehen«, 
so könnte man auch sagen, Hegel verstehen heißt einsehen, daß über ihn schlechter-
dings nicht mehr hinausgegangen werden kann. Sollte es noch ein »Nach – Hegel« 
geben, so mußte ein neuer Anfang gemacht werden.” R. Kroner: Von Kant bis Hegel. 
Bd. 1: Von der Vernunftkritik zur Naturphilosophie. Tübingen 1921, p. 6.
 4 W. Windelband: Vorwort. In: Idem: Präludien. Aufsätze und Reden zur Einführung 
in die Philosophie. Bd. 1. 4. Aufl. Tübingen 1911, Bd. 1, p. IV.
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school enumerates the eminent neo-Kantians and concludes as follows: 
“However, they are rightly called neo-Kantians since, because they 
have returned to Kant, they significantly pushed scientific philosophy 
forward”.5 Perhaps the thinkers indicated by Rickert as neo-Kantians 
are worth listing. These are: Otto Liebmann, Friedrich Albert Lange, 
Hermann Cohen, Wilhelm Windelband, and Paul Natorp, on whom he 
writes: “Certainly we cannot say that they were merely »Kantians«“.6 
For that reason, yet another question arises regarding the key that allows 
us to perceive them as genuine neo-Kantians. Whatever the perspective, 
it is yet another question concerning the understanding of neo-kantian-
ism. Hence, it appears that an attempt to answer the questions on the 
relationship between neo-kantianism requires providing answers to sev-
eral important questions, namely:
1. what is neo-kantianism?
2. what is neo-hegelianism?
3. what results from the relationship between them?
I
An attempt to define neo-kantianism is vulnerable to failure due to the 
complexity of the philosophical movement which, at the same time, tries 
to find the name for itself. All these difficulties were subject to numerous 
analyses; thus, there is no need to repeat them here.7 What deserves our 
attention is the fact that neo-kantianism does not stem from nowhere 
but constitutes an answer to a challenge faced by philosophy in the mid-
nineteenth century when, on the one hand, the Hegelian idealism col-
lapses and, on the other hand, the positivist-materialistic vision of re-
ality begins to dominate. That is why Christian Krijnen is right when 
assessing the historical context of neo-kantianism he makes the follow-
ing remark as: “Despite its name, neo-kantianism does not owe it only 
to the return to Kantian philosophy for the purpose of its determined 
continuation. Neo-kantianism was rather to simultaneously fulfil a po-
lemic task: It had to speak against those positivist, scientific, historical 
tendencies as well as those originating from the philosophy of life which 
caused post-kantian idealism to lose its dominant position in the spiri-
 5  „Aber sie werden mit Recht Neukantianer genannt, denn sie führten dadurch, 
daß sie auf Kant zurückgingen, die wissenschaftliche Philosophie zugleich erheblich 
vorwärts”. H. Rickert: Alois Riehl. „Logos“ 1924/25, Bd. 13, p. 164.
 6  Ibidem.
 7  Cf. A.J. Noras: Historia neokantyzmu. Katowice 2012, pp. 19–38.
58 Andrzej J. Noras
tual life of Germany shortly after Hegel’s death”.8 Neo-kantianism may 
no longer by its name constitute the renewal of Kant’s philosophy in its 
historical form, although the problem per se is whether historical phi-
losophy may be renewed to take on the same form as previously. The 
key is in the term used by Janina Kiersnowska-Suchorzewska claiming 
that the multiplicity of directions in neo-kantianism results from the 
fact that “his [Kant’s – AJN] legacy left to his numerous heirs was once 
again scattered: each received or, more precisely, seized a part of it – and 
treats it as pars pro toto. This is where the divergence of interpretations 
in neo-kantian theories originates”.9 The said “pars pro toto” is crucial 
as it directly results in the multiplicity of directions. A noteworthy, al-
though quite a concise interpretation of neo-kantianism, is proposed by 
Richard Müller-Freienfels (1882–1949), who analyses the most important 
philosophical trends of the beginning of the twentieth century. “In the 
concept of »neo-kantianism« – as he writes on neo-kantians’ attitude to 
Kant – which contains all these pursuits, stress should be made on »neo-
« and not on Kantianism, albeit its representatives, at least firstly, also 
highlighted the second part of the term”.10 This remark which, to the 
same extent, may refer to the representatives of neo-hegelianism, shows 
that the matter of a relationship between the thinkers emphasising the 
return and renewal of previous philosophy to the philosopher that they 
refer to is not at all explicit, as we need to immediately reject the belief 
that it is possible to reach the views of some mythical real author. Ob-
viously, such a stance must meet with the criticism of representatives 
of hermeneutics who claimed that an author may be understood better 
than he understands himself. Indeed, the problem consists in the fact 
that “better understanding” is simply the consequence of having deeper 
knowledge of the historical context in which the author needs to be con-
sidered. The author does not know the context as well as a person who 
takes a retrospective glance at a particular philosophy. However, what 
appears here for the very first time is the term “historical context” which 
immediately enmeshes a researcher in certain aporias.
Undeniably, the problem of hermeneutics is complex; however, it 
clearly communicates the issue to which Eggert Winter refers as “her-
meneutic fundamental aporia”11 and depicts on Cohen’s example. In the 
 8  Ch. Krijnen: Hegel und der Neukantianismus. Eine systemphilosophische Kon-
frontation. In: Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie. Hrsg. von D.H. Heidemann, 
Ch. Krijnen. Darmstadt 2007, p. 240.
 9  J. Kiersnowska-Suchorzewska: Metafizyka Kanta w świetle polemiki neokantystów. 
„Przegląd Filozoficzny” 1937, no. 40, p. 367.
 10  R. Müller–Freienfels: Die Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts in ihren Hauptströmun-
gen. Berlin 1923, p. 13.
 11  E. Winter: Ethik und Rechtswissenschaft. Eine historisch-systematische Untersu-
chung zur Ethik-Konzeption des Marburger Neukantianismus im Werke Hermann Cohens. 
Berlin 1980, p. 96.
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conclusion to his article dedicated to the controversies between Fried-
rich Adolf Trendelenburg and Kunon Fischer, the founder of the Mar-
burg School writes: “The levers of what belongs to the future are also 
the touchstone of what belongs to the past. A historical connection with 
what belongs to the past can be established only – and historical knowl-
edge of what belongs to the past opens only – in what is new within the 
old. With what is new we become internally united; in what is new we 
must participate as advocates of the truth if we are to succeed in cre-
ating the real history”.12 According to Winter, the aporia is that on the 
one hand we have the knowledge of the old contained in what is new, 
whereas on the other, that it happens without “bringing what is new 
into what is old”.13 For this reason, Cohen speaks of two things that we 
must not forget, namely that we should not mix the old with the new. 
However, we tend to forget about these principles, as does hermeneutics 
which fails to differentiate between them. As to understand a particular 
author better than he understood himself means to understand through 
the prism of what is new.
Thus, when Müller-Freienfels analyses the situation of neo-kantian-
ism in his short reasoning, he notes: “To a retrospectively looking ob-
server it should be amusing to see how all those shrewd thinkers who set 
out to find pure Kant with all their shrewdness in fact interpreted them-
selves into Kant (hineininterpretierten) and exactly by doing so they doc-
ument his philosophical meaning”.14 The artificially coined phrase “to 
interpret oneself into something” means nothing else but that these phi-
losophers adjusted their understanding of philosophy to the philosophy 
of Kant. In other words, this means that they found Kant because they 
found themselves. This fact is very clearly stressed by Hermann Cohen, 
who notes: “It is impossible to pass a judgement on Kant without expos-
ing in every verse what kind of world one carries in his head.15 Thus, he 
emphasises only that everyone reads Kant in their own way. And the 
sine qua non condition for the interpretation of the philosopher to whom 
a given philosopher refers is that in his doctrine he finds elements of that 
doctrine. Therefore, the condition of adjusting one’s concept to an old 
one consists in finding the elements that were not there. An interpreta-
tion is not as much reading anew as reading the new. The new mainly 
results from the historical context. Hans Wagner (1917–2000), who in his 
 12  H. Cohen: Zur Controverse zwischen Trendelenburg und Kuno Fischer. “Zeitschrift 
für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft”. Hrsg. von M. Lazarus, H. Steinthal. 
Berlin 1871, Bd. 7, p. 296.
 13  E. Winter: Ethik und Rechtswissenschaft…, p. 96. Cf. H. Cohen: Zur Controverse 
zwischen Trendelenburg und Kuno Fischer…, p. 293.
 14  R. Müller-Freienfels: Die Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts in ihren Hauptströmun-
gen…, p. 13.
 15  H. Cohen: Kantowska teoria doświadczenia. Trans. A.J. Noras. Kęty 2012, p. 30.
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analyses of science in the light of history emphasises the fact of the exis-
tence of historical and non-historical sciences and makes an attempt to 
demonstrate the problem of the said context. However, at the same time, 
he remains convinced that non-historical sciences, for instance physics, 
also have a history that they unconditionally need to refer to. Hence, 
Wagner believes it is necessary to explain three things if one wishes to 
achieve “a philosophical concept of historical understanding and an in-
sight into the theoretically principled (prinzipientheoretische) possibility 
of historical understanding”.16 Wagner is convinced that it is required to 
perform:
1.  a more accurate examination of an object of historical understan-
ding with its methodological specificity,
2.  a more accurate examination of the theorem of the so-called her-
meneutic circle,
3.  a more accurate examination of the internal structure of the rela-
tion between interpretation and understanding and enhance these 
considerations with the question of the possibility of internal and 
validating progressivism (geltungsmäßigen Progressivität) of histo-
rical understanding, i.e. establish whether historical understan-
ding is at all possible.
Wagner is a transcendentalist, who, while being ontologically-ori-
ented (the aftermath of his interest in Nicolai Hartmann’s philosophy), 
takes up the problem of hermeneutics by adopting a systematic perspec-
tive and in the light of the problematique of the final establishment char-
acteristic also for neo-kantianism. The key to understanding the history 
of philosophy is indeed found in the attempt to answer Kant’s question: 
how is historical understanding achieved? And, at the same time, it is 
revealed that the response given by representatives of hermeneutics is 
not satisfactory as it fails to consider all the circumstances which af-
fect historical understanding. Indeed, for historical understanding, it is 
necessary to expressly separate what is given by the author from what 
was added by an interpreter. Hermeneutics does not attempt to answer 
the thus formulated question; it does not even attempt to raise it. The 
assumption that revealing a broader context will help to better under-
stand an author is not necessarily true since it is based on learning what 
is new.
In reference to what has been said so far, Richard Müller-Freienfels 
characterised neo-kantianism in the following way: “As a result of that, 
the vague term »neo-kantianism« also does not define a uniform school 
but constitutes a collective definition of very different directions with one 
 16  H. Wagner: Philosophie und Reflexion. 2. Aufl. München–Basel 1967, p. 389.
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common thing only – that they speak in the Kantian language”.17 There-
fore, the concept of neo-kantianism according to Müller-Freienfels’s the-
sis is a “vague” and “collective definition” rather than a school. This is 
confirmed by a Danish philosopher, Harald Höffding (1843–1931), an 
author of the history of modern philosophy translated into German in 
the years 1895–1896, who writes: “That is why the so-called neo-kan-
tianism does not define a closed school but rather a pursuit (Bestreben) 
towards epistemological verification of the terms used. As opposed to 
the philosophy of romanticism, a lot from Kant’s study was captured by 
positivism”.18 In principle, this remains consistent with the conviction 
expressed by Ernst von Aster who, in his analyses of neo-kantianism, 
reduces it to two schools, namely the Baden and the Marburg school.19 
And by doing so, von Aster does not acknowledge the existence of the 
so-called neokantism, whose characteristic feature is Kantian philoso-
phy, and thereby rejects the attempt at “literal” understanding of Kant’s 
philosophy.
Willy Moog (1888–1935) speaks of “neo-kantians proper” when he 
writes: “Neo-kantians proper sought systematic refreshment of Kant’s 
teachings and liberating his cognitive theories from psychological and 
metaphysical remains”.20 This means that it is difficult to search for an 
orthodoxy here, which Paul Natorp explains as follows in his flagship 
text: “Speaking of an orthodox Kantianism of the Marburg school was 
never well-founded and along with further development of the school it 
lost even the faintest pretence of justification. It is true that, in his three 
fundamental works devoted to the interpretation of Kant, Hermann Co-
hen insisted on explaining the literary sense of the Kantian theorems (Sä-
tze) and understanding him on the basis of his own authentic, text-based 
(urkundlich), vital thoughts before it is possible to make an effort to go 
beyond Kant”.21 And again, the theme characteristic of neo-kantianism 
appears, namely, the suggestion of going beyond Kant.
From what has been said thus far, a slightly obscure portrait of 
neo-kantianism emerges which, however, still enables us to point out 
significant traits of its characterisation which may serve to indicate the 
differences between neo-kantianism and neo-hegelianism in order to de-
 17  R. Müller–Freienfels: Die Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts in ihren Hauptströmun-
gen.
 18  H. Höffding: Geschichte der neueren Philosophie. Eine Darstellung der Geschichte 
der Philosophie von dem Ende des Renaissance bis zu unseren Tagen. Bd. 2. Übers. von 
F. Bendixen. Leipzig 1896, p. 616.
 19  Cf. E. von Aster: Die Philosophie der Gegenwart. Leiden 1935, pp. 4–53.
 20  W. Moog: Die deutsche Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts in ihren Hauptrichtungen 
und ihren Grundproblemen. Stuttgart 1922, p. 181.
 21  P. Natorp: Kant a szkoła marburska. Trans. A.J. Noras. in: Neokantyzm badeński 
i marburski. Antologia tekstów. Ed. A.J. Noras, T. Kubalica. Katowice 2011, p. 241.
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termine whether it makes sense to speak of neo-philosophy at all. As 
indeed it appears to be misplaced, since if there existed an apriori pos-
sibility to define the relationship between philosophy and its renewed 
version, between philosophy and its neo-philosophy, in the first place it 
would be necessary to inquire about the sense of existence of neo-philos-
ophy. If each of them constituted a mere renewal of a historical thought 
it would probably be pointless. Therefore, it is required to consider two 
elements, namely, the assumption that neo-philosophy deserves our at-
tention only because it is more than the philosophy it refers to. Therefore, 
neo-philosophy has a certain “addition” in the form of the specificity of 
the person who interprets philosophy, as an interpretation constitutes 
a complementation, which raises certain doubts in the light of Richard 
Kroner’s remark, who – as it was already cited – stated: “As Windelband 
once said: »to understand Kant means to go beyond him«, thus we may 
say that to understand Hegel means absolutely not to be able to go any 
further”.22 However, the incapability to go beyond Hegel would mean 
an ideally constructed neo-philosophy – such that only recalls a particu-
lar philosopher.
The question that arises in relation to Kroner’s comment is as fol-
lows: if it is impossible to go beyond Hegel, does it make sense to renew 
his philosophy? Is it not true that we should rather treat it as a historical 
phenomenon and refer to it only in this context?
However, we need to go back to neo-kantianism and indicate its im-
portant elements, namely:
a)  neo-kantianism means “going beyond” – as Schnädelbach puts it, 
and only then it is possible. When the “going beyond” does not 
occur, what we deal with is “Kantian philology”, i.e.
b)  “going beyond” is based on methodological lawlessness and boils 
down to the methodological principle formulated by Janina Kier-
snowska-Suchorzewska which, on the other hand, comes down to 
the “par pro toto” formula,
c)  “going beyond” is therefore equivalent with the absence of ortho-
doxy – a subject already taken up by Natorp who in the article 
Kant and the Marburg School expressly states that: “Speaking of 
an orthodox Kantianism of the Marburg school was never well-
founded and along with further development of the school it lost 
even the faintest pretence of justification”,23
d)  the absence of orthodoxy results from the neo-kantians’ inten-
tion. What they mean does not consist in reading the problem in 
the light of Kant’s philosophy – this is what the problem of neo-
 22  R. Kroner: Von Kant bis Hegel. Bd. 1…, p. 6.
 23  P. Natorp: Kant a szkoła marburska…, p. 241.
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philosophy is often brought down to, but rather in using Kant’s 
philosophy to solve the problems faced by philosophy,
e)  this is confirmed by Gerd Wolandt with regard to three “Kan-
tian” works by Hermann Cohen, who states that the founders of 
the Marburg school did not speak of “[…] »historical Kant« but of 
a new systematisation of Kantian measures”24,
f)  we may probably point to a number of Cohen’s critics – and pre-
sumably many of them would be neo-kantians – who took up the 
problem of “orthodoxy”. A classic example in relation to Cohen 
may be Julius Ebbinghaus (1885–1981),
g)  neo-kantianism – at least it seems that way – possesses an analogy 
at a time approximated to its own, and it is not neo-positivism. 
Thus, we may conclude that not every neo-philosophy constitutes 
a renewal, restoration, invocation, and a tuned-up version of old 
philosophy.
II
Neo-hegelianism is not as much a negation of neo-kantianism as it 
is a development of the thinker’s philosophy constituting a model, 
i.e. Hegel; however, the said development is conducted towards a slight-
ly different direction. It is worth adding at this point that the term “neo-
hegelianism” (Neuhegelianismus) was allegedly coined by Fritz Berol-
zheimer (1869–1920), who highlights that Hegel understands history in 
the context of developmental tendencies and concludes: “That is why we 
reached  f o r  H e gel who depicted law in its developmental character 
and recognised history as the development of ideas. In this sense, we 
are n e o - h e g e l i a n s ”.25 It is also worth recalling the already quoted 
thought of Richard Kroner who points to two issues: (1) the incapability 
to go beyond Hegel and (2) the necessity to find a new beginning.26 How-
ever, it may be perfidiously stressed that the thinker who meets the con-
ditions laid down by Kroner is no-one else but Martin Heidegger. This is 
due to the fact that in the lecture from 1964 entitled The End of Philosophy 
and the Task of Thinking, Heidegger raises two questions:
 24  G. Wolandt: Einleitung. In: H. Cohen: Werke. Bd. 8: System der Philosophie. 3. Teil: 
Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls. Erster Band. Hildesheim–Zürich–New York 2005, p. X*.
 25  F. Berolzheimer: Das Programm des Neuhegelianismus. “Archiv für Rechts- und 
Wirtschaftsphilosophie” 1913, Jg. 7, p. 508.
 26  Cf. R. Kroner: Von Kant bis Hegel. Bd. 1: Von der Vernunftkritik zur Naturphiloso-
phie. Tübingen 1921, p. 6.
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“1. To what extent does philosophy end today?
2. What is the task of thinking at the end of philosophy?”.27 
However, the absurdity of this thesis rests in the fact that it would 
never cross anyone’s mind to perceive Heidegger as a representative of 
neo-hegelianism. Thus, is Kroner’s thesis false? By no means, only the 
range of its impact should be limited to earlier times. Moreover, Helmut 
Holzhey28 points out that the term “neo-hegelianism” originates from 
a book by Wilhelm Tobias devoted to the limits of cognition, and in fact, 
Tobias speaks of “bold neo-hegelianism” in reference to the concept cre-
ated by Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) and John Tyndall (1820–1893).29 At 
the same time, the researchers of neo-hegelianism unanimously point 
out the fact that it did not transform into a school. “A characteristic 
feature of German neo-hegelianism – as Heinrich Kleiner states in this 
spirit – is that from the increasingly intensely shaped debate with He-
gel only insignificant directives resulted, those regarding the systematic 
transformation, further development or conversion of Hegel’s philoso-
phy. Thereby, Heglism was incapable of founding a school of a form 
comparable to neo-hegelianism”.30 He is accompanied by Peter Hoeres, 
who observes: “The formation of a school, as it was the case with neo-
Kantians, was what neo-Hegelians failed to achieve, although Hermann 
Glockner (1896–1979) seeks a parallel depiction of the phases of develop-
ment of neo-kantianism and neo-hegelianism in the scheme comprising 
three phases – philology, prospective presentation, own establishment 
of a system”.31
The problem becomes complicated here for two related reasons. First 
of all, because the situation of philosophy after Kant’s death is differ-
ent as compared with that following Hegel’s death. This is pointedly 
explained by Herbert Schnädelbach; hence, it is worth quoting a longer 
passage which opens his article devoted to new neo-kantianism:
“When in the jubilee year of 1981 the Stuttgart Hegel Congress de-
voted to the issue Kant of Hegel? was held, to some this question might 
have sounded like a pseudo-alternative. Unfortunately, no questionnaire 
 27  M. Heidegger: Koniec filozofii i zadanie myślenia. Trans. K. Michalski. In: M. He-
idegger: Ku rzeczy myślenia. Trans. K. Michalski, J. Mizera, C. Wodziński. Warsaw 
1999, p. 77.
 28  Cf. H. Holzhey: Neukantianismus. In: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. 
Bd. 6: Mo–O. Hrsg. von J. Ritter, K. Gründer. Basel 1984, p. 748.
 29  W. Tobias: Grenzen der Philosophie: constatirt Riemann und Helmholtz, vertheidigt 
gegen von Hartmann und Lasker. Berlin 1875, p. 37.
 30  H. Kleiner: Neuhegelianismus. In: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Bd. 6…, 
p. 743.
 31  P. Hoeres: Krieg der Philosophen. Die deutsche und die britische Philosophie im 
Ersten Weltkrieg. Paderborn 2004, pp. 61–62.
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was distributed then in relation to this question, however, we can be 
certain that when given such a choice over ninety percent of those who 
currently practise philosophy would have responded: »Kant, naturally!« 
Who else still wants to be a Hegelian today? Many interpret Hegel – me-
ticulously and persistently, but their readiness to also argument his phi-
losophy usually remains on hold; their fixation on Hegel is then myste-
rious. With Kant the situation is completely different; if researchers do 
not see themselves as historians of philosophy, they are researchers and 
interpreters of Kant’s philosophy, and, by principle, also Kantians; i.e. 
their historical and systematic interests are headed in the same direction. 
After all, Kant’s philosophical authority is currently irrefutable, or so it 
seems, thus if we were to decide »Kant or Hegel?« we would all stand 
behind Kant. Does it then mean that because of this we are all Kantians 
or neo-Kantians?”.32
Secondly, it is worth pointing out the fact that contrary to neo-kan-
tianism which slowly developed in philosophy, hegelianism managed to 
immediately develop a school founded by Hegel’s first followers, name-
ly scholars such as Philipp Konrad Marheineke (1780–1846), Eduard 
Gans (1798–1839), or Karl Ludwig Michelet (1801–1893). It is also signifi-
cant that, right at the beginning, a dispute occurred among Hegelians, 
thus leading to the establishment of the Hegelian right and left wing, 
which – as it is commonly known – was a reaction to the work published 
in 1835 by Dawid Friedrich Strauß (1808–1874) Das Leben Jesu.33 Hence, 
we may risk a thesis that already after Hegel’s death hegelianism de-
veloped these forms of reception which became the neo-Kantians’ share 
only since 1865.
However, this does not solve the problem of neo-hegelianism as the 
already mentioned Peter Hoeres points at Erich Kaufmann (1880–1972) 
as a thinker whose “neo-kantianism and neo-hegelianism no longer ap-
pear as a continuation of the plot but as hostile philosophies”.34 A prime 
example is Kaufmann’s criticism of neo-kantian philosophy of law 
as a follower of the Baden school.35 The hostility visible in Kaufmann 
slowly becomes the call sign of neo-hegelianism, and its beginnings may 
be sought already in the student of Wilhelm Dilthey, Ferdinand Jakob 
Schmidt (1860–1939) who in 1908 introduced a division in neo-kantian-
ism and started to speak of old-Kantians, pseudo-Kantians, and neo-
Kantians. Schmidt sees a problem in the fact that old-Kantians are not 
 32  H. Schnädelbach: Nasz nowy neokantyzm…, p. 15.
 33  Cf. A.J. Noras: Kant i Hegel w sporach filozoficznych osiemnastego i dziewiętnastego. 
Katowice 2007, pp. 136–138.
 34  P. Hoeres: Krieg der Philosophen…, p. 61.
 35  E. Kaufmann: Kritik der neukantischen Rechtsphilosophie. Eine Betrachtung über die 
Beziehungen zwischen Philosophie und Rechtswissenschaft. Tübingen 1921.
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recognised by neo-kantianism although, in fact, among neo-Kantians he 
recognises philosophers who are not necessarily connected with broadly 
understood neokantism. These are Rudolf Haym, Eduard Zeller, Kuno 
Fischer, and Otto Liebmann.36 Moreover, Schmidt perceives neo-kan-
tianism as a pseudo-doctricism.
The problem of neo-hegelianism is that in contrast to neo-kantianism 
it did not develop in the form of a school, which is connected with the 
division visible at its core. Wolfgang Schild depicts this ambivalence in 
reference to the neo-hegelianism of Josef Kohler (1849–1919), a lawyer 
and professor of the University of Berlin. The idea that is a key to under-
standing Kohler’s neo-hegelianism in relation to previous philosophy is 
as follows: “For his philosophising still means (also) a discussion with 
particular philosophers of the past, a critical acquisition of foreign past 
thoughts, and so also using previous recognitions whose truth survived 
throughout the history”.37 This is also the sense of a continuous discus-
sion of philosophical problems, that is a constant work on persistently 
undertaken problems. The only advantage is that we do not need to be-
gin ab ovo each time. Indeed, the problem lies in the fact that referring 
to previous philosophy is not always connected with progress. This is 
how Schild expresses this idea in relation to Kohler as he tries to indicate 
that we cannot speak here of a simple interrelation. This is the thesis by 
Schild evaluating Kohler’s neo-hegelianism, who emphasises that “the 
adoption of Hegelian philosophy as a whole would mean a regression”.38 
At the same time, one more important issue is revealed in Schild’s con-
siderations, namely the insufficiency of modern philosophy.
Schild refers to the thesis by Fritz Berolzheimer, who straightfor-
wardly writes: “J. Kohler […] is a neo-Hegelian”.39 In Schild’s view it is 
all the more important that Kohler seeks the “enemies” of philosophy 
and finds them in historicism, positivism, the neo-kantian philosophy of 
law and, finally, in the theory of the law of nature with variable content 
identifiable with the Marburg school of Rudolf Stammler (1856–1938). 
What is more, Schild is convinced of legitimacy of the stance represented 
by Kohler. Neither historicism nor positivism raise doubts as positions 
that cannot be maintained. However, the question of understanding the 
 36  F.J. Schmidt: Kant-Orthodoxie. In: Idem: Zur Wiedergeburt des Idealismus. Philoso-
phische Studien. Leipzig 1908, p. 226.
 37  W. Schild: Die Ambivalenz einer Neo-Philosophie. Zu Josef Kohlers Neuhegelianis-
mus. In: Deutsche Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie um 1900. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Gründ-
ungsgeschichte der internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (IVR). In 
Verbindung mit Konrad Cramer, Ralf Dreier und Werner Maihofer herausgegeben 
von Gerhard Sprenger. Stuttgart 1991, p. 46.
 38  Ibidem, p. 47.
 39  F. Berolzheimer: System der Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie. Bd. 2: Die Kul-
turstufen der Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie. München 1905, p. 439.
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neo-kantian philosophy of law is not unambiguous; therefore, Schild’s 
declaration may be interpreted as an explicit proof of his determined-
ness. Yet, we need to admit that he is right when it comes to his evalua-
tion of Kohler’s position, whose neo-hegelianism is incomprehensible to 
Schild. And it is such since Schild writes the following as he evaluates 
his stance: “As a matter of fact, Kohler formulated his result already in 
1883: »What remains from hegelianism are the great ideas of world de-
velopment and the idea of unity in multiplicity«. Generally speaking, 
however, he saw Hegel’s philosophy as overcome”.40 Nonetheless, later 
Kohler changed his stance regarding the evaluation of Hegel’s philoso-
phy and sided with neo-Hegelians.
III
Therefore, what results from this short presentation of neo-kantianism 
and neo-hegelianism?
Firstly, the conviction that the term “neo-philosophy” says nothing 
about the kind of the presented philosophy and merely constitutes infor-
mation that we might seek in it a certain pattern from the past. Nonethe-
less, these patterns are to a smaller or greater extent present in “neo-phi-
losophy”. The neo-kantianism of the Marburg school is neo-kantianism 
because it is unorthodox, whereas the neo-kantianism of the so-called 
Kantian philology representatives fails to fulfil this condition.
Secondly, we have the related awareness of possible differences 
within “neo-philosophy”. If we were to ask about the uniformity of neo-
philosophy, it would emerge that to the greatest extent it is concerned 
with neo-positivism. Still, it is difficult to speak of uniformity in the case 
of neo-kantianism, neo-hegelianism or neo-tomism, which however 
tends to be omitted in considerations.
Thirdly, it is absolutely necessary to revise the view that neo-philos-
ophy stems from a lack of knowledge and understanding of philosophi-
cal problems. By the way, this thesis is eagerly repeated by supporters of 
the history of philosophy understood as an auxiliary science of philoso-
phy (whatever is meant by this). On the contrary, neo-philosophy means 
an acknowledgement of the richness of thoughts of the philosophy of 
the past.
 40  W. Windelband: Die Ambivalenz einer Neo-Philosophie…, p. 64.
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Summary
Neo-kantianism and Neo-hegelianism.  
Comments on Neo-philosophy
The article addresses the problem of neo-philosophy in the light of its relation 
to philosophy while constituting its renewal. The subject matter of the reflection 
is the analysis of neo-kantianism and neo-hegelianism, whereas the result of the 
conducted analyses is a conviction that it is not possible to speak of a simple 
analogy between philosophy and neo-philosophy which relates to it. Even if this 
analogy were possible in the case of neo-hegalianism, certainly such a situation 
cannot and does not occur in the case of neo-kantianism. The latter is character-
ised by a lack of orthodoxy in relation to Kant’s philosophy which in fact is its 
characteristic feature.
Keywords
neo-kantianism, neo-hegelianism, Marburg school, Baden school
